Abstract-In the modern car, electronic devices are even employed for safety-critical missions like brake control, where failures might cost human lives. Among various approaches to increase the reliability of those devices, pervasive formal verification most securely rules out all systematic failures. The main target of the Verisoft project is the development of technology for pervasive verification. Its application has been demonstrated in the automotive context by an exemplary distributed system consisting of hardware, a real-time operating system, and application programs. The contribution of this paper is a formal refinement proof linking an abstract specification of this real-time operating system to its C implementation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The continually increasing number and variety of electronic components in cars results in an exponential growth for communication channels. Over time, adding more and more wires has led to space, complexity and maintenance problems. As an alternative, several components can share the same wire and use a communication protocol on this bus. For that purpose, Kopetz and Grünsteidl [1] have developed the time-triggered protocol, which schedules fixed transmission times for each component on the bus. Variations of this protocol are nowadays widely accepted in industry.
The approach has, however, its disadvantages: Previously independent components meanwhile share the same bus, which requires clock synchronization and a reliance on former safety-uncritical components -a problem with the multi-media system should certainly not propagate to the brake system. The safest way to prevent such problems is the exclusion of systematic errors by formal verification. Certainly, this method cannot be limited to a single system layer but should span over as many layers as possible. While program verification has been known and used over decades, the pervasive verification of complete computer systems still remains a grand challenge [2] .
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Among others [3] , the Verisoft project takes on this challenge. The goal of its automotive subproject is a pervasively verified distributed real-time system, consisting of hardware, a real-time operating system, and application programs. Pervasive verification means that all system layers are coupled by formal soundness and simulation theorems, such that any verification result, obtained on a suitable layer, can ultimately be transferred down to a correctness theorem on the hardware level. Our operating system OLOS has been implemented on a verified processor [4] using a generic programming framework for operating systems [5] . An emergency-call system [6] , [7] serves as an example for its practicability. In our paper, we report on the refinement proof from an abstract specification layer down to the source code of this operating system.
Our contribution is an important milestone towards an evidence-based validation of safety-critical systems. We have shown that formal methods can indeed produce the evidence that an operating-system implementation meets its specification, providing the highest possible level of quality assurance for software. The developed verification technique and the overall proof architecture may be reused in similar contexts. In the long run, source-code verification should supplement software certification, which is currently limited to solely monitor the development process [3] , [8] . For safety-critical software, both, formal methods and software engineering, can thus become two complementing disciplines aiming at the same target: 100% reliable software.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section explains the context of our work, including the design principles of OLOS and our verification environment. In Sect. III, we elaborate on the implementation, while Sect. IV presents the formal specification of our real-time system. Our key contribution constitutes the formal correctness theorem shown in Sect. V. We conclude in Sect. VI.
II. BACKGROUND
Our distributed system comprises a number of components that are connected via a communication bus. These socalled electronic control units (ECUs) consist of a generalpurpose RISC processor and an automotive bus controller (ABC). The latter takes care of the timely transmission and reception of messages. This device is responsible for clock synchronization, decoupling the processor from the communication bus. In its mediator role, the ABC buffers the messages from both sides, using pairs of send (SB) and receive buffers (RB) in order to deal with metastability, a common problem in electronic circuit design.
Our operating system OLOS runs on the processor, providing a virtual processor abstraction to the applications that share the same physical processor. OLOS supports its own message buffers (MB) for the communication between applications (on the same as well as on different physical processors).
In the following subsections, we introduce the principles of the time-sharing communication scheme, on the one hand, and our verification environment, on the other hand.
A. Our Time-Sharing Communication Protocol
The schedule of the transmission times on the bus is statically fixed and repeated perpetually. A period, or round, is subdivided into equal time slices, the so-called slots. The organization of a round is described by several scheduling tables. Each ECU features its own set of these tables. Firstly, the send-permission table (SPT) specifies for each slot, whether the ECU is allowed to send. Secondly, the application scheduling table (AST) determines for each slot, which application should compute. Finally, a buffer-index table (BT) identifies in each slot, which message buffer of OLOS is exchanged with the device. Table I shows scheduling tables for the two communicating ECUs that we use as a running example in our paper.
We divide each slot into four phases: device communication, receive, compute, and send. Fig. 1 depicts them for slot 2 of our running example.
Device Communication: In this phase, the ABC device is communicating with the other ECUs via the bus, while the remaining phases are characterized by communication with OLOS. In our example, ECU 1 broadcasts the message that OLOS has written to the device in the previous slot. All ECUs receive this message from the bus.
Receive: The operating system reads the receive buffer from the ABC device into its own message buffers. Fig. 1 shows how the operating system reads the message that the device has received in the previous slot into the message buffer indicated by the BT table from the previous slot.
Compute: The AST specifies the application that is executed during this phase of the current slot. This application may compute locally or exchange messages with OLOS.
Send: This phase is only present if the corresponding ECU is permitted to send in the next slot -in our example, ECU 2. The operating system writes the message to be sent in the next slot into the ABC's send buffer.
B. Verifying C Programs -the Isabelle/Simpl Framework
The formalizations presented in this article are mechanized and checked within the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [9] , implementing higher-order logic [10] . This paper is written using Isabelle's document generation facilities, which guarantees that the presented theorems correspond to formally proven ones. We distinguish formal entities typographically from other text. We use a sansserif font for types and constants (including functions and predicates), e. g., map, a slanted serif font for free variables, e. g., x, and a slanted sans-serif font for bound variables, The logical and mathematical notions follow the standard notational conventions biased towards functional programming. We only present the more unconventional parts here. We prefer curried function application, e. g., f a b instead of f (a, b ). In this setting the latter becomes a function application to one argument, which happens to be a pair.
Isabelle/HOL provides a library of standard types like Booleans, natural numbers, integers, total functions, pairs, lists, and sets as well as packages to define new data types and records. Isabelle allows polymorphic types, e. g., a list is the list type with type variable a. In HOL all functions are total, e. g., nat ⇒ nat is a total function on natural numbers. There is, however, a type a option to formalize partial functions. It is a data type with two constructors, one to inject values of the base type, e. g., x , and the additional element ⊥. A base value can be projected by x , which is defined by the sole equation x = x. As HOL is a total logic, the term ⊥ is still a valid yet un(der)specified value. Partial functions can be represented by the type a ⇒ b option. The syntax and the operations for lists are similar to functional programming languages like ML or Haskell. The empty list is [], with x # xs the element x is 'consed' to the list xs. With map f xs, the function f is applied to all elements in xs. The n-th element of a list xs can be selected with xs [n] . A record is constructed by assigning all of its fields, e. g.,
Field fld 1 of record r is selected by r.fld 1 and gets updated with a value x via r(|fld 1 := x|).
For the verification of C0, a fragment of C, we use a general program-verification framework for sequential imperative programming languages: Isabelle/Simpl [11] , [12] . It is built as a conservative extension on top of Isabelle/HOL. The key feature of Isabelle/Simpl we use is the notion of a total correctness Hoare-triple:
t P c Q. This judgment claims, that in procedure environment , given an initial state for which the precondition P holds, execution of statement c terminates and for the final state the postcondition Q holds. The assertions P and Q are formalized as sets of states. Isabelle/Simpl is polymorphic over the state space; we use records but hide the details by an Isabelle syntax, such that { . var = 5} denotes the assertion that the value of program variable var in state is five.
Expressions in Simpl are HOL expressions. Statements, in contrast, are represented by a datatype, which we present in pseudo-code notation employing Isabelle's powerful syntaxtranslation machinery. The procedure environment is a partial function from procedure names to statements, which is consulted when calling procedures.
The framework includes a big-step semantics, a Hoare logic for partial as well as total correctness and an automated verification-condition generator for Simpl. Within this sequential core language, assembly fragments as well as C0 are embedded. The embedding is based on a compiler converting C0 constructs in terms of operations provided by the smallstep semantics of the RISC processor. A correctness proof for this compiler, which links the small-step semantics to the Simpl big-step semantics, is also provided [13] . This correctness theorem about the embedding of C0 into Simpl allows for mapping low-level properties to more abstract ones formulated on the big-step semantics of C0. Alkassar et al. have dedicated a separate article [14] on the semantics stack in Verisoft.
III. IMPLEMENTATION

A. CVM: A Programming Framework for Operating Systems
Our operating system (OS) is implemented on the verified RISC processor VAMP [4] using a programming framework called communicating virtual machines (CVM) [5] . This framework encapsulates the necessary hardware-specific low-level functionality for operating systems built on the VAMP. It provides basic mechanisms for address translation and processor virtualization as well as the communication with memory-mapped devices. Technically, CVM constitutes the central interrupt-service routine of the OS, which is executed whenever an interrupt occurs in the system. The interrupt-service routine saves the hardware-specific context and then passes control on to the higher layers of the OS. The higher software layers may control the low-level mechanisms by so-called primitives. This software architecture permits the implementation of an operating system almost independently from hardware in C0 without assembly.
We distinguish two interrupt sources: On the one hand, external interrupts might occur, which comprise the reset signal (upon power up) and interrupts generated by peripheral devices. On the other hand, the currently executed instruction may cause exceptions like an illegal instruction or a misalignment. Most notably, if an application is computing, it may cause an exception with the special instruction trap in order to explicitly call the operating system. The instruction features an immediate constant to identify a certain OS functionality. Upon such a system call, the processor immediately transfers control to the interruptservice routine.
After saving the old processor context, the interruptservice routine calls the C function kdispatch of OLOS. In OLOS, the function kdispatch and its subroutines call CVM primitives for the communication with the ABC device and the manipulation of application registers and memory. The return value of kdispatch determines, which application should resume its computation. In the next subsection, we describe the functionality of kdispatch in more detail.
B. The Top-Level Function of OLOS
When an interrupt arrives, the CVM framework saves the old processor context and calls kdispatch with two parameters: the interrupt cause, a bit vector of occurred Initialization: a reset interrupt. In this case, the CVM internal data structures and then passes the interrupt on to the kdispatch bit set, kdispatch olos_init. This , on the one hand, and confi gures the ABC device, on the other hand. The remaining interrupt vector is ignored.
ABC Interrupt: The ABC device raises its interrupt line is scheduled to send a message on the bus in the next slot, the device raises its interrupt to signal that the compute phase device. As soon as the send phase has fi nished, the device raises its interrupt line again and the operating system reads handle_int. Receive call), and a message identifi er msg id selecting the message respectively.
The parameters are held in registers. The implementation reads them using the CVM primitive cvm_get_gpr and simply application (using the CVM primitive cvm_set_gpr). Send), using cvm_v2pcopy Receive). Finally, the designated error register is set to the value SUCCESS.
IV. F specifi cation. In our case, this specifi cation is an automaton.
i. e., assuming a certain device state, the operating system expected behavior. The specifi cation then comprises the and the external environment, on the other hand. Fig. 4 init state, the interrupt line is raised in the read and the write state, and idle and write Figure 6 . Simulation between implementation and model calls), which are similar to conventional function calls. In particular, we augment the state space of the overall program with an additional program variable cvmX representing the external, hardware-specific state. Semantically, an XCall is a function call performing a transition on this external state and communicating with C0 via parameter passing and return values. In our case, the external state comprises an identifier of the current application, the processor state of all applications, and the ABC device configuration. Secondly, operating-system verification deals with nontermination. Observe, however, that our top-level routine of OLOS itself terminates while the endless loop is realized in the low-level hardware-specific parts. Hence, we simply formulate a single OLOS step -in analogy to the CVM primitives -as an ordinary Simpl function. Then, we expand the correctness theorem over unbounded execution traces.
In particular, we express correctness in terms of simulation between the execution traces of the implementation and the abstract ECU automaton, which both have been introduced in the previous two sections. Fig. 6 depicts the situation in detail: The implementation starts in the state 0 directly after power up. Its first transition I ECU yields in state 1 that can be abstracted via abs ECU to an initial specification state. This simulation is retained by all further transitions. Below, we define prerequisites like abs ECU and outline the induction proof for our correctness theorem.
A. Prerequisites
For our correctness theorem, we need a number of prerequisites. Firstly, there is the Simpl function cvmstep representing a combined step of CVM and OLOS. We model the reset interrupt by the global variable reset and assume that its initial value is True. The initial value corresponds to the processor state right after power-up. If reset is True, cvmstep changes it to False, initializes the applications, and invokes kdispatch with an interrupt vector of 1, i. e., exactly the reset interrupt is raised. In further computations, a cvmstep execution consists of the following parts: If there is a current application, it executes a single step. Then, CVM computes the bit vector of occurred interrupts, combining the exceptions caused by the current application and occurred device interrupts. If there are any interrupts, CVM calls the kdispatch function with the bit vector and determines from the function's return value, which application will become the current one in future steps. Note that the return value might not be a valid application identifier, in which case CVM will idle in future steps until the next device interrupt.
Secondly, we need a simulation relation. More precisely, we use the function abs ECU that maps implementation states to model states:
The function constructs a state of the ECU automaton as described in Sect. IV-B. From the external CVM state, we extract the applications and the device configuration. They are stored in the components AM and abc dev, respectively. Furthermore, the variable of the current application ca is abstracted to the idle flag, i. e., the flag is raised iff .ca = IDLE. Finally, the message buffers are gathered from the different memory objects in the implementation, which are scattered over the heap.
Thirdly, we formulate an invariant over the implementation states. This predicate excludes implementation states that cannot occur in an execution trace. Recall that we prove the simulation between implementation and specification by induction. Our induction is based on the fact that the state after the first cvmstep at power up can be abstracted via abs ECU to an initial specification state. The inductive step formalizes that the abstraction relation is preserved by any possible further cvmstep. We combine properties of these further steps in our invariant, which is established at the induction start and preserved by the inductive step.
This invariant comprises assumptions on variables containing the schedule, the current slot, the applications, and the device. For instance, OLOS and the device independently store information on the schedule or the current slot. Certainly, the redundant information must not be contradicting. We have already learned in Sect. III-B about another constraint: The variable ca has either the value of the application scheduling table in the current slot or the special value IDLE. Furthermore, we require the well-formedness of the message buffers and their content. These constraints arise from a weaker typing model in Isabelle/HOL, e. g., representing fixed-length arrays by lists. With all prerequisites in place, we can formalize our inductive proof.
B. Induction Start
The induction start formalizes the correct bootstrap at power up. As already mentioned, we assume that the reset variable initially has the value True. Additionally, we require well-formedness, e. g., the correct length of the list repre-senting the array of message buffers. Finally, we presume that the peripheral device system is in an initial state. These constraints comprise well-formedness of the device state, on the one hand, and the correct set-up of flags (see Sect. IV-A), on the other hand. We combine all these assumptions in the constant at power up . After the initial cvmstep, the invariant invariant holds for the successor state , and the abstracted state abs ECU is an initial specification state:
Theorem 1 (Induction start). After power-up, the initial cvmstep yields in a state, which can be related via abs ECU to an initial specification state. Moreover, the invariant holds for the yielded state. Formally:
The code, which initializes the required data structures and the device, can roughly be divided into three parts, each containing a loop. We have to show the correctness not only for the execution and the loop invariants of each part, but also the property preservation from one to the following piece of code. The problem of passing on invariants and interim results to discharge next preconditions does not only appear between separated pieces of code but also within a single loop. This is always the case when sequential instructions depend on each other, i. e., in the second loop where three different CVM primitives initialize registers, allocate memory and load applications.
C. Induction Step
In the induction step, we assume that the invariant initially holds, i. e., invariant . Additionally, we require that the simulation relation between specification and implementation states hold. Note that the postcondition of the induction start establishes this assumption. After each execution of cvmstep, the invariant should hold for the successor state. We show that the invariant and the simulation are preserved by the execution of cvmstep on the implementation layer and a transition on the specification layer.
Theorem 2 (Induction step). The simulation relation and the invariant are preserved under a cvmstep. Formally:
Proof: In our proof, we distinguish three possible phases: receive, compute and send (the device communication does not involve OLOS). In all these phases, the applications and the ABC device are strictly separated. The send and receive phase affect the operating system as well as the ABC devices whereas the compute phase only regards the current application and OLOS. Both phases concerning the communication with the ABC device require the validity of the device and the OLOS variables as well as the contents of send, receive and message buffers after a message transmission. In the compute phase we show the validity of the interaction between the operating system and the current application in case of an incoming exception or trap. If no timer interrupt occurs before the application finishes its execution, we distinguish between a "normal" execution step of the application, a system call or another exception. We have to assure in all cases that the application remains valid, i. e., that the values of the PCs, registers and memory are correct. Otherwise the timer occurs before the application has finished. Every execution step except a trap is finished first, before the receive or send phase is entered. Afterwards, the applications, message buffers and devices have to be valid.
D. Simulation
Concluding from the two previous theorems, we claim that the simulation relation continues to holds after an initial execution of cvmstep over all finite traces. Formally we obtain this simulation by employing the soundness theorem of the Hoare logic [12] . This theorem allows us to interpret the proven Hoare triples on the operational semantics, which results in a transition function, in our case, because we have proven termination and C0 is deterministic. Note, that within the transition function I ECU , we combine the C0 computation and ABC transitions analogous to ECU . In our formal theorem, we iterate transitions over a list of optional external inputs is using the function fold. 
Theorem 3 (Simulation
VI. CONCLUSION
We have formally verified functional correctness of the real-time operating system OLOS in the context of pervasive verification. This operating system has been designed for an industrial context. By our extensive case study, we have challenged the current verification tools. Our complete formal work is available online. 1 With our work, we respond to a long lasting grand challenge [2] as well as to a general encouragement [16] for more experimental work in computer science. The section proceeds with related work, gained insights and future work.
A. Related Work
We are indebted to Klein for a comprehensive article [3] on past and present approaches to operating-system verification. Summarizing, Klein only presents a single, fully verified operating system: KIT, a small assembly program, that provides task isolation, device I/O, and single word message passing. This verification project can only be referred to as groundbreaking in the area of pervasive verification. The operating system is very far from any real system and the verification is based on a fairly abstract LISP execution model. OLOS, in contrast, is implemented in C and has been developed with an industrial use case in mind.
Several past verification projects concentrated on the specification but fell short on the actual verification, e. g., UCLA Secure Unix [17] or VFiasco/Robin [18] . Other projects, like Embedded Device [19] , were successful in the verification but did not reach down to the code level. Furthermore, the Flint project [20] verified the correctness of certain low-level assembly fragments but did not aim at full code coverage. Embedded Device and Flint amend our work towards higher and lower layers, respectively. Finally, the L4.verified project [21] , [22] completed the refinement proof for a generalpurpose microkernel just days before this paper went on print. While their kernel is much more complex than OLOS, they verified neither boot-up nor assembly code.
Beside these projects, there are several other verification attempts within the Verisoft project [23] . 2 Our pervasive approach has been the subject of earlier papers [13] , [14] as well. Most notably, the verification of the microkernel VAMOS [24] has reached a mature state. While this kernel has more features than OLOS, its current verification state does not cover the system's start up.
B. Gained Insights from Pervasive Verification
The aim of pervasiveness has considerably influenced our verification approach and its result: We were able to rely on previous work, namely VAMP, CVM, and Isabelle/Simpl, which considerably increased the possible degree of reliance that our verification result indeed holds for the overall system. Certainly this approach has also disadvantages.
Pervasive verification is inherently based on the integration of all verification results into one single, coherent theory. The tight integration of results from various authors with different backgrounds poses its own challenges [13] . Within our work, we particularly perceived a high sensitivity to changes made by other verification engineers, on the one hand, and considerable friction losses because of different formalization styles and even duplicated definitions and proofs for similar problems, on the other hand.
Furthermore, several iterations were necessary in our verification process until we could verify our main theorem because earlier abstractions turned out to be insufficient. The task of building a model stack extending over several abstraction levels -ideally from the gate-level implementation up to applications -proved to require much foresight and extreme prudence for the definition of the layer's interfaces because changes of the formalization usually spread over several layers and are thus very costly. Though this fact can certainly be expected, we considerably underestimated the necessary number of iterations, notably increasing the overall verification effort. Including all iterations, adaptions and several improvements, we approximate the effort for our correctness proof with 2 years.
C. Future Work
We foresee several possible extensions of our work. Firstly, our verification approach implicitly assumes that our real-time operating system is capable to timely handle the incoming device interrupts. We have proven that our interrupt handler, the top-level function of OLOS, terminates. In order to set up a correctly running system, however, we need an upper bound of its worst-case execution time. A possible approach for its computation is static worst-case execution-time analysis [25] .
Secondly, CVM is currently specified on an abstract level while its correctness proof is carried out on a lower level. The property transfer between Simpl and the small-step layer used for CVM correctness has been done before [26] , demonstrating the general applicability of our approach. Furthermore, the model stack can be extended in the opposite direction: the applications are currently modeled on assembly level while usually written in C. Using Leinenbach and Petrova's [27] , [28] theorem on compiler correctness, it is possible to provide a more abstract programming model for applications and their interaction with the operating system. A similar approach [29] has been taken for the VAMOS microkernel, already.
Finally, our correctness statement is yet limited to a single slot schedule because of restrictions in our tool chain: The schedule is currently specified via implementation constants in the code. These constants are formally fixed in the generated code; the current verification framework is incapable to instantiate a correctness proof for multiple schedules. We are confident, however, that this problem can be solved using recent improvements of Isabelle/HOL [30] and a comparatively small enhancement of Isabelle/Simpl.
